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Abstract:  
This paper addresses the fundamental question about the ‘becoming’ of the 
landscape of China’s neighborhood governance. Based on a governmentality 
framework, it carries out a genealogical review on the neighborhood governance 
in the Feudal dynasties, Maoist era and post-Maoist era and summarises the 
connection between the historical and current governmental rationalities, 
government technologies and the formation of subjectivities. The conclusion 
indicates that spatial practice and social norm have always been regarded by 
Chinese governors as the main approaches to legitimize and consolidate their 
regimes at the neighborhood level, although different governments used different 
technologies to design and organise neighborhoods. The rationality of 
segmenting urban space into administrative unit was inherited by the Maoist 
government to design enclosed Dan-wei compounds and used by the current 
government to demarcate the boundary of She-qu neighborhood as well as 
implement Wang-ge management. The Feudal rituals and Socialist norms on the 
other hand, shaped hierarchy-respecting and collective subjectivities and to a 
large extent regulated Chinese people’s behaviours and facilitated the 
government’s practices. This paper ends by pointing out that as the fragmenting 
Chinese society and hybrid government technologies shape diverse, multifaceted 
and ambiguous subjects, the government will confront more challenges on 
neighborhood governance. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the Chinese central government has intensively delegated 
public administrative functions to the local governments and urban neighborhood 
becomes a new arena of policy intervention. In the Chinese central government’s 2006 
‘building a harmonious society’ strategy and the Chinese Communist Party’s newest 
vision of ‘renovating social management mechanism’ on the Eighteenth National 
Congress (2012), the Chinese government repeatedly reinforced its determination to 
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consolidate its institutional power at urban neirboughood level and the important role of 
neighborhood governance in public administration. In recent literature, urban 
neighborhood has been widely described as the most active interface of China’s state-
society interactions (Gui, 2007; Wang, 2009; Chen, 2010; Yue, 2010). Different views 
have developed about the state’s power exercise at the neighborhood level. Some 
scholars believe that comparing to Maoist China, the current Chinese government is 
losing its ability of social mobilisation at the neighborhood level (Lin, 2003; Pan, 2006), 
while others argue that the Chinese government is actually trying to penetrate its power 
into the grassroots society by strengthening its administrative control on urban 
neighborhood according to the institutional reforms (Xu, 2001; Li, 2002; Liu, 2005). 
However, the burgeoning discussions usually limit their scopes on post-1978 and 
overlook more fundamental questions concerning the becoming of the political 
rationalities and government technologies in today’s landscape of neighborhood 
governance in China. Questions such as ‘To what extent have the historical Chinese 
political rationalities and technologies been inherited by the current government?’ and 
‘How do the Chinese citizens become governed with the influence of both traditional 
and modern governing technologies?’ need to be discussed in order to fully capture the 
nature of China’s transitional statehood and the complex dynamics of neighborhood 
governance.  
Foucault’s method of political genealogy, with its idiosyncratic and antiquarian 
interest in the emergence of political ethics and subjectivity (Szakolczai, 1993: 28), 
provides a critical reflection on these questions. The influence of historical governing 
elements on the modern society has been widely discussed in Foucault’s work 
(Foucault, 1961, 1980, 1982). China’s long history as a centralised political and cultural 
entity makes it a good candidate for a genealogical review on whether (and how) the 
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historical governing rationalities and technologies play an implicit, but pervasive role in 
today’s governance. As Liu (2002) puts that, ‘it is the through the hierarchized and 
dispersed historical forces that organizational and institutional power gain their life in 
everyday life in contemporary China.’ In recent years, the proliferating literature on 
China’s changing statehood contributes to an increasing number of studies on the 
government’s changing governmentalities in the realms of education, environment 
protection, religious policies and sexual health (Jeffreys, 2009). However, 
‘governmentality’ has not been systematically used as a conceptual tool in the realm of 
Chinese neighborhood governance.   
This paper carries out a genealogical exploration on how urban neighborhoods 
have been used to exercise state power by the historical and current Chinese 
governments, and then further explores the correlation between the historical and 
current neighborhood governaning practices. The analysis framework is based on three 
main concepts of Foucault’s governmentaltity theory, including the rationality, 
government technologies and subjectivity. The term of governmentality, defined by 
Foucault as the ‘rationalism of governmental practice in the exercise of political 
sovereignty’ (2004: 04), has generated proliferating discussions on the ‘how’ of 
governing: how we govern, how we are governed and the relation between the 
government of the state, the government of others and the government of ourselves 
(Dean, 1999:2). It provides a critical perspective to understand and evaluate the 
government practices in the modern society from the following dimensions:  
• The ‘governmental rationality’ in the published strategies and objectives, 
especially in defining some problems and objectives and making them visible to 
public and obscuring other problems and making them invisible and ‘not 
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important’. This dimension looks at the way governments rationalize and 
legitimize their strategies and objectives with specific knowledge claim.  
• The ‘government technologies’, or the ‘distinctive ways of thinking and 
questioning, relying on definite vocabularies and procedures for the production 
of truth’. It addresses the questions of ‘what methods does the government use 
to govern population and to accomplish its specific objectives’.  
• The government’s characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, 
actors or agents. This dimension concerns the forms of individuals and 
collective ‘subjectivity’ though which governing operates and which specific 
practices and programmes of government try to form (Dean, 1999).  
 
The remaining content consists of three parts. In the first part, the neighborhood 
designed with the feudal ‘Zhou-li’ planning values and the Feudal governing 
technologies will be reviewed. In the second part, the socialist rationalities and 
government technologies in the Maoist neighborhood of ‘Dan-wei’ will be explored and 
in the third part, the hybrid governmental rationalities and technologies in the post-
Maoist neighborhood of ‘she-qu’ will be discussed. This paper will end with wider 
discussions on the impact of historical governing governmentalities on the current and 
future landscape of urban governance in China. 
2. Neighborhood governance in Feudal China (221BC-1911AD) 
In 221 BC, the first Feudal dynasty was established in China, which was known 
as Qin. During the following two thousand years, although this territory has seen the 
rising and falling of tens of Feudal dynasties, it has generally been regarded as a unified 
cultural entity with a centralized governing origin (Tanner, 2009). Through the long 
history of Feudal dynasties (221BC-1911), a fundamental governing principle had been 
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adopted by the emperors was to divide the population into hierarchical social classes, 
and then to administrate people by spatially segregating them, emphasizing the 
hierarchy and restraining the mobility between them. The Feudal rulers used a series of 
population policies, spatial designing approaches and philosophies to maintain a 
hierarchical social order, meanwhile cultivated citizens to respect the social order and 
regulate themselves. As the basic units of cities, urban neighboughoods were the 
ultimate arena where population policies and spatial design were implemented. The 
neighborhood life directly reflected the governmental rationalities to administrate the 
society and was also a mirror of the then state-society relation. From a complex of 
historical materials describing China’s ancient urban life, this section summarizes some 
representative governmentalities in the Feudal neighborhood governance (Table 1).  
Table 1. Some governmentalities in China’s Feudal urban neighborhood governance 
Governmental 
rationalities 
• Spatialize authoritarian power according to urban 
spatial design 
• Legitimate hegemony and social hierarchy on the basis 
of social norms 
Government 
technologies 
• Use gate, wall, curfew and other spatial elements to 
define social space  
• Hu-kou 
• Emphasizes Confucian rites and family-based social 
order 
Characteristics of  
citizen’s subjectivity 
• Self-identification in hierarchies 
• Self-cultivation according to traditional social norms 
 
 
2.1 Governmental Rationalities  
 
Spatializing authoritarian power according to spatial planning was a most widely 
implemented governmental rationality in Feudal China. Most dynasties’ capitals and big 
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cities was designed according to a strict guideline system described in Zhou-li, or Rites 
of Zhou, a book recording the ancient Chinese rituals (141-87BC). In a chapter named 
Kao-Gong-Ji, or Records of Traders, we can find precise description on the ancient 
Chinese urban spatial layout as following: 
 
‘The Jiang-ren (craftsman) constructs the state capital. He makes a square nine Li (500 
meters) on each side; each side has three gates. Within the capital are nine north-south 
and nine east-west streets. The north-south streets are nine carriage tracks in width. On 
the east is the Ancestral Temple, and on the west is the Altars of Soil and Grain. On the 
south is the Hall of Audience and on the north are the markets.’  
 
This famous paragraph is widely cited in books focusing on Chinese urban 
planning, as it not only contains detailed description of the ancient urban morphology, 
but also reflects the traditional ethics, ideals and the ruler’s governing logics behind the 
spatial layout. The urban space is neatly segregated into pieces in order to emphasize 
hierarchy and facilitate the exercise of imperial power. All the elements in the spatial 
layout have a ritual meaning, including the direction, the width of roads the size of gates 
and so on. From these spatial elements, ancient Chinese cities developed into highly 
sophisticated, preconceived constructions, which served as a physical manifestation of 
cosmological beliefs, bureaucratic hierarchies, and the practicalities of daily life (Wu, 
2013). 
Apart from spatial practices, social norm also played a pervasive role in 
rationalizing and strengthening state power in ancient China, with the form of a 
hierarchical ‘ritual system’. As discussed by Foucault and other governmentality 
researchers, government’s practices and policies designed to engender people’s 
internalized desire to adhere to social norm are deeply embedded in history (Ewald, 
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1990; Foucault, 1977; Miller and Rose, 2008; Nettleton elt, 2012). In China, there were 
records describing how Feudal emperors used norm to legitimize and stabilize their 
authority early back to the Warring States (3rd Century BC- 1st Century BC). In the 
famous historical work of Stratagems of the Warring State, the role of norm was stated 
in three main aspects. Firstly, respect for norm was a basis for the legitimacy of 
emperorship. An emperor must gain the acknowledgement of the ‘heaven’ to gain the 
formal legitimacy of his/her emperorship and he/she also must respect interstate norms 
to win majority states’ recognition of his/her authority. Secondly, norms provided the 
emperors with the legitimacy to use military force. Thirdly, to establish a new regime, it 
is necessary to change the current norm system to adapt to changes in the society (Yan, 
2011). Relating these rationalities to the ‘Zhou-li’ system, we can find very clear 
expression of social norm in the spatial planning: the important ‘spots’ of a city are 
especially mentioned in Kao-Gong-Ji, including the Ancestral Temple, the Altars of 
Soil and Grain, the Hall of Audience and the markets. These spots, which respectively 
represented the royal ancestry, god of land, politics and everyday life, were allocated in 
specific directions with respect to the hierarchical social norms. The emperors’ 
ancestors were in a higher rank than the god of land so their temple located on the east. 
Similarly, the political hall of audience was regarded as more important than citizens’ 
daily needs so it located on the south. Within the same logic, urban neighborhoods were 
planned and designed with abundant normative meanings. The following section will 
move on to explore how Feudal rulers implement their governing rationalities in the 
neighborhood design and administration. 
 
2.2 Governmental technologies 
  
2.2.1 Wall, gate and curfew 
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During the last two thousand years, the urban planning principles in Zhou-li 
were repeatedly implemented by feudal governors to build their capitals: the Chang-an 
of Tang dynasty (current city of Xi’an), Bian-liang of Song dynasty (current city of 
Kaifeng), Da-du of Yuan Dynasty (current city of Beijing) and Beijing of Ming and 
Qing Dynasty were all designed with a similar layout of the ‘ideal city’ described in the 
Zhou-li. The wall of these cities kept rural residents out and gate guards strictly 
controlled the population mobility between rural and urban areas. Within these cities, 
the gridded road system further divided the city into enclosed blocks, which became the 
boundary of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were allocated around the city and took the 
form of walled and gated wards which, like the cities themselves, could be closed off at 
night (Wu, 2013: 62). The mainstream justification of the neighborhood walls and gates, 
as recorded by Guanzi living in the Warring States period (475-221 BC), was that an 
enclosed residential system could reduce the opportunities for crime. Therefore within 
the neighborhood, there were even more walls dividing different households and 
different units within one household. To facilitate surveillance on citizens and maintain 
social order, the neighborhood gates were guarded at all times by wardens, who needed 
to keep entering and exiting record and responsible for all overall management.  
Meanwhile, a strict curfew was declared to prevent residents moving outside their 
neighborhood in the evening. According to these regulations, urban neighborhood 
became integral to the everyday policing of social order within the city (Yang, 1993).  
Recently, the important role of wall, gate and curfew has been increasingly 
discussed in China’s urban study. It is strengthened by many researchers that the 
technologies of gate, wall and curfew played a pivotal role to facilitate rulers defining a 
neighborhood-based social space and controlling the mobility of residents (Barme and 
Minford, 1989; Jenner, 1992; Yang, 1994; Bray, 2005). In fact, a broader review on the 
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historical Chinese urban form shows that the logic of segregating urban space is 
reflected in various urban elements over time (table 2). The open space, markets and 
distribution of functions activities are all designed in enclosed patterns with walls, gates 
and curfew control. These elements, together with neighborhoods, perfectly illustrate 
the Chinese Feudal rulers’ practices of spatializing the authoritarian power: from the 
width of streets to the size of residences, from the curfewed neighborhoods to the 
regulated markets, the state exerts direct control on individuals by regulating their 
mobility and behaviours.  
Table 2 The elements of Chinese ancient urban form (Gaubatz, 1999a) 
 
Elements Early traditional 
(2nd century BC- 10th  
century ) 
Later traditional 
(11th century - 19th century) 
Open space Within walled compounds 
Field areas within walls 
Markets Within walled enclosures 
Peddler system Stalls and shops along streets 
Market areas from outside city walls 
Monumental 
structures 
Government courtyard compounds 
Office in courtyard compounds Guide Halls 
Distribution of 
functions and 
activities 
Residential, administrative and 
commercial areas contained 
within walled, separate 
compounds 
Some residential and commercial 
areas joined, areas differentiated by 
occupation  
 
 
2.2.2 Hu-kou 
         
Apart from the spatial practices, since Han Dynasty, the feudal Chinese 
government used a ‘household registration’ (Hu-kou) system to classify citizens 
into different social classes and govern them by restraining their spatial mobility 
(Chan, 2008). The technology of Hu-kou was believed to derive from the 
population statistics system in the West Zhou Dynasty (1046BC-771BC), when 
the nation-wide population statistics were collected in both cities and rural areas 
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to facilitate levy (Lu, 1999). In Han Dynasty (25-220AD) the population statistic 
system was promoted nationwide and the term ‘Hu-kou’ was officially used as 
the basic unit of census and a means to implement population control. People 
from one family were registered as in one ‘household’ (Hu). Once the citizens 
were registered into a certain household, their personal information was officially 
recorded and they were forced to live where they were registered. In most of the 
Chinese feudal dynasties, the household registration system has continually been 
used by the central government as a means of levy and conscription. The Tang 
Dynasty (618-907) government developed a sophisticated Hu-kou system, which 
classified citizens into nine classes (hu-fen-jiu) and levied them in different 
standards. The following dynasties of Song (960-1279), Yuan(1271-1368), 
Ming(1368-1644)  and Qing(1644-1911)  all imitated the Tang’s Hu-kou system 
and classified citizens according to their land property, social status and career. 
According to the household registration system, population mobility in feudal China 
had been kept at a very low level to facilitate sovereign control over different social 
classes.  
 
 2.2.3 Li: Feudal rituals  
 
The strict and hierarchical neighbouthood administration system and social order 
described above was pervasively supported a hierarchical system of Li, or social rituals  
(Cook and Powell, 2000; Read, 2003; Gui, 2007). The rituals in Feudal societies, from 
the statehood-level management to the everyday family life, were described in the 
Confucius Analects in many famous doctrines. The hierarchical ritual order in sequence 
was heaven, land, lord, family, teacher and self (Tian, Di, Jun, Qin,Shi). From emperor 
to ordinary citizens, everyone should respect this ritual order to keep the overall order of 
the country, as recorded in the Analects that: ‘if for a single day a man could return to 
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the observation of the rites through overcoming himself, them the whole empire would 
consider benevolence to be his’ (XII.1). 
At neighborhood level, the most influential rites were practiced according to 
clan rules. In ancient China, family played an important role in people’s social life as 
most citizens lived in big families with strong sense of belonging to their clans (jia-zu) 
(Wright, 1962). Within clans there was strict a hierarchy: the clan ancestors had the 
loftiest status, followed by the clan leaders, family leaders, parents and siblings. One 
must respect the ethical order meanwhile clearly understand his own status in the family 
to behave properly. Absolute obedience to parents was required, as recorded in the 
Analects that: ‘If you see your advice being ignored by your parents, you should not 
become disobedient but should remain reverent. You should not complain even if you 
are distressed’ (IV.18). The clan rules to a large extent specified the conduct of 
individual, family, clan and social life by emphasising the order of kinship and the 
relationship among members. As Wang Liu (1959) summarised that, the clan rules 
exercised social control upon the clan’s individual members, and provided moral 
orientation to them with concrete specifications for proper conduct and desirable and 
undesirable behaviour.’ In a broader sense, the clan rules regulated the order of families, 
which were the basic units of the Feudal society, and maintained the social order at 
grassroots level. Meanwhile, by strengthening the connections among family members, 
the clan rules to some extent kept citizens from social and political activities outside the 
clan, which was also believed to consolidate Feudal regimes.  
 
 
2.3 Confucian Subjectivity  
         
In Feudal China, the deeply-embedded hierarchy in social rites had a profound 
influence on how Chinese people identify themselves within the society and reflect 
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themselves in everyday life. As Sigley (1996:468) put that: ‘to be Chinese meant to 
subscribe to a particular mode of living - to engage in certain ritual practices, ranging 
from the number of times one bathed per day to the position and rank one was accorded 
in a funeral procession.’ Wright (1962) summarised some classical behaviour patterns 
of Chinese advocated by Confucianism as following: 
(1) submissiveness to authority—parents, elders and superiors 
(2) submissiveness to the norms 
(3) reverence for the past and respect for history 
(4) love for traditional learning 
(5) esteem for the force of example 
(6) primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized competence 
(7) noncompetitiveness  
(8) self-respect in adversity 
(9) punctiliousness in treatment of others 
The first five personalities described above all required people to identify 
themselves first in a group, then within specific hierarchies. In their daily interpersonal 
contacts, people were reminded about the hierarchy in all sorts of relationship: the 
parent-children relationships, relationship between brothers, marriage relationships, clan 
relationship, friendship and so on. Similarly, people’s respect for history, norms, 
tradition and examples all derived from their acknowledgement of hierarchy. The 
following four personalities on the other hand, reminded people to keep reflecting and 
cultivating themselves in their contact with others. In Confucianism, self is the always 
the center and souse of doing things and has the capacity of developing itself according 
to its interaction with the world (Cheng, 2004: 125). This indicated that one should rely 
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on himself to improve his personalities, knowledge and then become a better person. 
Based on this doctrine, individuals became the microcosms of the society: by achieving 
a perfect moral harmony in person, political harmony can be achieved and by regulating 
themselves, individuals can contribute to an organized social order (Kupperman, 2004). 
The historical review above provided a governmentality-inspired perspective for 
many well-know governing approaches in ancient China. To summarize, according to 
explicitly reinforcing social hierarchy, both the widely applied ‘Zhou-li’ spatial 
planning system and the social norms were used by Feudal emperors to legitimize and 
consolidate their regimes.  At neighborhood level, the Feudal rulers designed enclosed 
compound neighborhoods and used the technologies of wall, gates, curfew to exert 
regulation on citizens’ mobility and behaviours. Meanwhile, the Feudal rituals, 
especially the Confucian doctrines and clan rules played a pivotal role in regulating the 
citizens’ self-identification and behaviors in their relationship with their families and 
neighbours. This paper will now move to discuss the governemntalities of the Maoist 
regime between 1949 and 1977, which is widely recognized as an upheaval of the 
historical Chinese governing approaches meanwhile still have pervasive influences on 
nowadays’ neighborhood governance. 
3. Maoist urban neighborhood governance (1949-1977) 
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, the Chinese 
government adopted a rigid socialist system for the next three decades and launched 
massive political movements in attempt to build a completely new social structure. It 
looked that there was a huge revolution in the government’s governing approach: the 
government firmed renounced Feudal rites in its discourses and launched all sorts of 
new spatial practices in urban construction to eliminate the Confucian and other Feudal 
rites’ influence. However, a deeper exploration showed that some Feudal governmental 
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rationalities were implicitly inherited by the socialist government to legitimize its 
regime and facilitate exercising power at neighborhood level. Specifically, although the 
government adopted some new technologies to design and manage neighouhoods, these 
practices still aimed to shape collective-oriented subjectivity (Table 3). 
Table 3. Some governmentalities in China’s Socialist urban neighborhood governance 
Governmental 
rationalities 
• Spatialize authoritarian power according to Hu-kou and 
urban planning 
• Legitimate hegemony by breaking the traditional social 
norms and building a new Socialist norm system 
Government 
technologies 
•  ‘Dan-wei’ compound 
• Street Office- Residents’ Committee (S-R) system  
Characteristics of  
citizen’s subjectivity 
• Collective-oriented  
• Political active 
 
 
3.1 Inherited governmental rationalities 
         
After the foundation of P. R. China, the country was in an urgent need of post-
war construction. To facilitate its administration, the Chinese government inherited the 
Feudal rulers’ rationality to spatialize power in its practice of urban planning— firstly in 
the population mobility control between the rural and urban spaces, secondly in the 
spatial design. The Hu-kou Policy continued to be used to restrain the rural-ruabn 
population mobility. In January 1958, the first household management law –The 
People's Republic of China Household Registration Ordinance—was promulgated 
to implement a city-rural dual management system (Cheng-xiang-er-yuan-guan-
li). This ordinance, by following the tradition, classified citizens into two 
categories according to their places of birth: urban citizens were registered as 
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‘Urban Householders’ and rural citizens were registered as ‘Rural Householders’. 
The rural householders were not allowed to seek job in cities and the transfer of 
households was extremely hard. 
Meanwhile in cities, the Feudal logic of demarcating space into compound 
forms and creating social space with these compounds can be easily found in the 
appearance of the Socialist neighborhoods of ‘Dan-wei’. As Yang put that:  
 
‘In the past the basic unit of city was the courtyard house, which corresponded 
to the family; now the basic unit of the city is the compound, which corresponds to the 
Dan-wei. While these two organisational units in fact represent two different types of 
social structure, the enclosed compound form and the implication of wall culture have 
continued in an unbroken historical line’ (1994:254).  
 
The walls demarcated the space of neighborhoods, as in the past they defined the 
realm of family (Bray, 2005). In many ancient cities, neighourhoods were designed in 
very large size with comprehensive functions (Wan, 2013). In socialist cities we found 
the same planning logic: the Dan-wei compounds were designed into enclosed spaces, 
which contained factories, commerce and comprehensive infrastructures. Most citizens’ 
life radius was mainly within the Dan-wei compounds (Chai, 1996). With these 
demarcated compounds, both the Feudal and Socialist government made to create a 
social space for citizens and manage them as a group. 
Social norms continued to played an essential role in legitimizing hegemony. 
Following the traditional governing strategy described in the Stratagems of the Warring 
State， the Chinese government tried to build a new norm system to support its regime. 
The hierarchy-focused Feudal norms were defined as backward and exploitive and were 
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dismissed while Marxism and Leninsm were attributed as the core values to guide and 
regulate social behaviors. However, the contents of many advocated Socialist norms 
actually derived from ancient norms, especially Confucian norms. For example, on the 
Eighteenth CPC National Congress, the Socialist codes of conduct were defined as 
‘patriotism, delication to work, integrity and amity.’ All these codes could be found in 
the Confucian Analects. As many researchers pointed out that, the specificity of Chinese 
socialism is that it is built upon a mature Confucian norm system. Therefore many 
proposed norms were more or less based on some Confucian doctrines meanwhile with 
Socialist theoretical support (Zhao, 2002).  
 
3.2 New Government technologies 
        
The 20th century saw a population proliferation and persistent urbanization 
process in China. The urban form became more diverse and irregular in patter. Many 
walled neighborhoods compounds were replaced by open and street-form 
neighborhoods. As the urban economy prospered and urban life became more diverse, 
the government gradually lost direct control over the neighborhood. After 1949, the 
government launched new many practices to strengthen the neighborhood-level 
administration. Spatially, the Dan-wei compounds were planned to replace the ancient 
gated neighborhoods and created new social spaces for citizens. Institutionally, the 
state-owned enterprises (Dan-wei) and a two-tier administration system, namely Street 
Office-Residents’ Committee- together took on the role of public administration at 
neighborhood level. 
 
 3.2.1 Dan-wei compound  
 
In Maoist era, the state-owned enterprises (Dan-wei) took charge of providing 
accommodation and public services for their employees. To enhance productivity, they 
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usually constructed the residences close to the factories and basic idea formed the 
predominant form of neighborhood in Maoist China- Dan-wei compound. The planning 
logic behind was to create a neighborhood environment that combined citizens’ daily 
life with collective labour. Typical Dan-wei compounds were designed into enclosed 
neighborhoods with comprehensive functions. Factories and working areas were usually 
the functional centres of the compounds. Living areas and other supporting facilities 
were allocated around the compound. The Socialist planners believed that spatial forms 
could operate like machines for the transformation of culture. Therefore when designing 
the Dan-wei compounds, they arranged the workshop, dormitories, canteen, 
kindergarten and sports grounds within a symmetrical and handy space to facilitate the 
daily needs of a working community, with the hope of formulating a new social order 
on the basis of social class (Bray 2005: 93). Indeed, the Dan-wei compounds to a large 
extent broke the cosmological and hierarchical order of the Confucian family and 
formulated a new neighborhood-based social order. The spatial arrangement of the 
living and working spaces in Dan-wei compounds easily enhanced the social network 
among the residents as they had highly similar social and life circle. For the citizens, the 
traditional family-based social lives were shattered and replaced by the intimacy with 
their colleagues, neighbours and leaderships. Therefore, many domestic researchers 
described the Dan-wei compounds as ‘mini-societies’ as they were not only merely a 
spatial unit, but also contributed to the foundation of a collective culture and created a 
strong sense of belonging for citizens (Huang and Low, 2008). 
 
3.2.2 Street Office- Residents’ Committee system (S-R system) 
 
As the Dan-wei played the predominant role in delivering public goods and 
social welfare to citizens, most citizens had their housing, medical care and education 
services provided by their Dan-weis for free. There were only a small number of urban 
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residents could not enjoy these welfares such as the disabled, unemployed and some 
socially disadvantaged groups. To administrate them, the government established a 
delegated organ, namely Street Office (jie-dao-ban-shi-chu), at the street level as a 
stopgap measure to organise urban residents who do not yet belong to any Dan-wei 
(Bray, 2006: 533). The official institutional functions of the street office defined by the 
1954 Urban Street Office Organisation Regulation were: (1) Help municipal 
government and district government implement correspondent policies. (2) Supervise 
Residents Committees with their daily work. (3) Reflect the multitude’s opinions to 
higher level government. Meanwhile, at a more grassroots level, a neighborhood-based 
resident self-governing organisation, called ‘Residents’ Committee’ (Ju-min-wei-yuan-
hui), was established to work with the Street Office at the urban neighborhood level. 
The Residents’ Committee was defined as a ‘mass organisation founded by residents 
and has its members democratically elected by the multitude to coordinate with the 
Street Office to implement policies and accomplish relevant work targets’ (1954 Urban 
Street Office Organisation Regulation). The members of Residents’ Committee worked 
full time as ‘representatives of residents’. The Street Office and the Residents’ 
Committee formed a grassroots administration system – S-R system (jie-ju-zhi)– which 
as a supplement of Dan-wei system.  
In Maoist China, the Dan-wei had comprehensive functions and developed with 
strong local influence (Lu & Perry, 1997:176). The S-R system however, worked at 
neighborhood level with very limited authority and power. The disparity of power 
between the Dan-wei and the S-R system lasted through the Maoist era. In 1957, the 
central government postponed local governments’ urban planning schemes and 
enhanced the Dan-wei’s administrative function. Dan-wei substituted most functions of 
local governments to administer the urban residents. During the Cultural Revolution 
19 
 
(1966-1976), the central government further strengthened the administrative power of 
Dan-wei and the S-R system was transferred into a pure political institution called the 
‘Revolutionary Committee’ (ge-ming-wei-yuan-hui). The Revolutionary Committees 
were nominally in charge of urban neighborhood affairs but actually handed most 
resources over to Dan-wei and the government power was almost vacant at the street 
level in cities (Murphey, 1980; zhu, 1999) 
 
3.3 Dan-wei subjectivity 
 
Although the Maoist government’s spatial practice of Dan-wei compound broke 
the traditional family-based social order and formulated a working class-based social 
order, these practices still concentrated on producing collective rather than individual 
modes of subjectivity. Like the Confucian clan rules which specified clear roles and 
statuses for different family members, the Socialist Danwei organize its members by 
allocating them specific work and roles. Civil affairs such as labour training, education, 
housing distribution and the management of personal information were all carried out in 
unity in specific time and space. The life circle and life style of citizens, from the 
costume to the everyday food, were all highly unified. The standardization of living and 
working spaces within Dan-wei reinforced the principles of egalitarianism and the 
residents’ common identity (Bray, 2005). From this perspective, both the feudal clan 
and Socialsit Danwei worked towards producing a disciplined, collective and loyal 
urban population.  
Political activeness was another product of the Socialist government practices. 
Differing from the feudal governors who kept the citizens away from political issues, 
the Maoist government actively involve citizens in political lives to strengthen their 
political loyalty. Political activism was attributed a high-rank virtue of citizen in the 
government discourses (Solomon, 1969). According to massive neighborhood-based 
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political campaigns and propagandas, the Communist Party cultivated a group of 
activists in neighborhood who worked between the government and residents as 
mediators. Theses activists were regarded as key operational figures in political 
mobilisation and surveillance (Read, 2003): they passed down political orders to 
residents and mobilised political participation from bottom according to frequent private 
contact with their neighbours. This approach was totally contradictory to the Feudal 
neighborhood governance. 
To summarize, the socialist Chinese government, although made clear claims for 
rebellion against the Feudal governing approaches, actually inherited the fundamental 
historical rationalities of legitimising and consolidating its regime by explicit population 
mobility control and normative regulations. With the new technologies of Dan-wei 
compounds and the street-level S-R administrative system, the government attempted to 
break the family-based social order in neighborhoods and establish working class-based 
neighborhood social networks.  All these new technologies were applied on the basis of 
a population which was fundamentally shaped by traditional Chinese values, and still 
aim to reinforce its collectivism. This paper will now move to explore the 
governmentalities in post-Maoist neighborhood governance, which present both 
inheritance of history and introduntion of western experiences in front of the challenge 
of rapid social transition. 
4. Neighborhood governance in post-Maoist China (1978-Now) 
         
Since 1978, the Chinese central government began to reform the economic 
structure and embraced a more liberal ‘market economy’ system due to serious financial 
deficit. To stimulate urban economy, the government loosened its Hu-kou policy control 
on population mobility and allowed rural residents to seek job in cities. The following 
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three decades saw a massive urbanization process, in which the number, size and 
population of city proliferated around China. For the Chinese government, 
administering an opening society with a huge and increasingly fluid population is an 
unprecedented challenge. The diversifying social stratification, increasing population 
mobility and influx of rural-to-urban migrants has brought about huge pressure for 
urban governance. The socialist administration system which relied heavily on the Dan-
wei turned out to be unsuited to the transitional urban society as many state-owned 
enterprises bankrupted with the shock of market economy.  
In the 1990s, a series of reforms were adopted in the realm of urban 
neighborhood governance, from which we can see the government’s transforming 
rationalities. Firstly, space played a much weaker role than before in regulating 
population mobility, as the government’s urban spatial practices became market-
oriented. Secondly, the government handed over the public services which used to be 
delivered by the Dan-weis to local governments, meanwhile devolving a part of this 
responsibility to private sectors, social sectors and individuals due to western influence. 
Thirdly, the government brought back the traditional Chinese rituals to maintaining 
social cohesion meanwhile cautiously brought in western institutional experiences and 
discourses in the hope of steadily reform the neighborhood administration system from 
a rigid socialist to a more diverse and liberal system, without harming the Communist 
Party’s political stability. With the new technologies of ‘She-qu’ and ‘wang-ge’, the 
post-Maoist government worked towards implementing more soft control over citizens’ 
thoughts and conduct and shaped more multifaceted subjectivities (Table 4). 
Table 4. Some governmentalities in China’s post-Maoist urban neighborhood 
governance 
Governmental 
• Market-oriented spatial practices 
• Delegate administrative function 
22 
 
rationalities • Bring back Feudal norms meanwhile cautiously bring 
in western institutional experiences and discourses  
Government 
technologies 
•  ‘She-qu’ system 
• ‘Wang-ge’  
Characteristics of  
citizen’s subjectivity 
• diverse 
• multifaceted 
• ambiguous 
 
 
4.1 Transforming rationalities  
 
In the post-Maoist era, the Chinese government’s spatial practices differed 
largely from the Socialist era. After bringing market economy system, the government’s 
overall strategy of urban planning changed from evenly distributing industries and 
facilities in compounds to flexibly developing urban lands according to market forces. 
To stimulate urban land economy, the government reformed the land ownership in the 
1982 Constitution and declared the state’s ownership of urban lands (ibid). The 1990 
Provision Regulation on the Granting and Transferring of Land Rights over State-
owned Land in Cities and Towns for the first time, recognized the ‘land use rights’ as a 
commodity and allowed the transfer of land use rights. It meant that the use right of 
urban land within built up areas could be temporarily ‘transferred’ to enterprises and 
individuals by local governments. The ‘land use right transfer fees’ then became an 
important aspect of local revenue. To increase land income, local governments launched 
massive construction projects in cities since the 1990s. The Socialist urban form which 
was based on Dan-wei compounds was quickly shattered and replaced by market-
oriented urban form which could be widely found in western countries. The government 
still demarcated neighborhoods into gridded administrative units but it had very limited 
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control over the neighborhood’s land use development as the property rights diversified 
in urban development.  
As the socialist Dan-wei quit the stage in national economy, the central 
government devolved increasing fiscal independence and administrative discretion to 
local governments to strengthen the local government’s ability to govern and provide 
public services. The delegation of power was promoted between the municipal 
government and lower levels of public institutions in many big Chinese cities during the 
1990s. At the neighborhood level, a new administration system –namely She-qu – was 
promoted by local governments to replace the Dan-wei system and deliver public 
services. The Street Office- Residents’ Committee system, which used to play a 
marginal role, was delegated to take charge of the She-qu system. Meanwhile, as the 
Chinese society became increasingly fragmented within the high-speed development, 
the Socialist values and norms were strongly shocked by influences of international 
trends of thought. To maintain the social order in neighborhood, the government on the 
one hand brought back the Confucian norms which emphasized family-based ethical 
order and self-cultivation (Hoffman, 2010), on the other hand began to bring in the 
western values of ‘public participation’ in attempt to cultivate more responsible and 
self-governed residents (Hoffman, 2014). The government’s ‘She-qu’ and recent 
‘Wang-ge’ practices demonstrated its changing rationalities. 
4.2 Hybrid government technologies 
 
4.2.1 She-qu:  
 
The term ‘She-qu’ refers to a both sociological concept and a geographical 
concept in Chinese: firstly, it is a demarcated spatial unit with clear geographical 
boundaries; more importantly, it refers to a street-level administration system (Bray, 
2006). In most cities, the two-tier S-R system plays the administrating body of She-qu. 
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In 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affair officially demarcated the territory of She-qu as ‘the 
area under the jurisdiction of the enlarged Residents Committee.’ (2000). Unlike Dan-
wei compounds, the new She-qu neighborhoods take a variety of spatial forms. The 
most common form of them are the gated ‘Xiao-qu’ enclaves which are built by private 
developers. In the Xiao-qu enclaves, a new form of community-based organisation 
named ‘property-owner committee’ (ye-zhu-wei-yuan-hui) began to play an active role 
in rights protection and many public affairs in recent years. The S-R system on the other 
hand, took on the function of delivering the social insurance, part of medical care and 
some public services to residents. 
Although gaining increasing functions and financial independency in recent 
years, both the property-owner committees and the S-R systems have very limited 
control over the residents’ individual lives and much weaker capacity of social 
mobilisation than the socialist state-owned enterprises. To maintain social order, the 
government begins to embrace more hybrid technologies to govern urban 
neighborhoods. In the central government’s 2006 ‘building a harmonious society’ 
strategy, the Confucian ideal of ‘harmony’ was officially reintroduced by the 
government to reinforce social stability. The term ‘harmony’ plays a key role in Chinese 
thoughts through long history and by reintroducing the concept of ‘harmonious society’, 
the government portrays a different world in which the Chinese traditional virtues such 
as filial piety, patriotism and collectivism are attributed as the dominating values rather 
than the ‘Western model of a neoliberal market society which is shaped by profit 
maximization, wealth idolization, and consumer culture (Heberrer, 2011:58). According 
to its discourse of ‘harmony’, the Chinese government brings back the Confucian norms 
of self-cultivation and ethical orders in order to encourage citizens to regulate 
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themselves and behave properly in their family, neighourhoods and careers (Hoffman, 
2014).  
At the neighborhood level, She-qu is targetted as a pivotal arena to ‘build a 
harmonious society’ and to cultivate responsible, moral and self-regulated citizens (Liu, 
2005: 213-221), as the former vice-chairman of P. R. China Zeng Qinghong (2003-
2008) states that: ‘ She-qu (community) is the cell of society. The harmony of She-qu is 
the foundation of social harmony. We should regard building harmonious She-qu as the 
accessing point of our work to build a harmonious society’ (2007). Wan’s research 
(2013) on Beijing’s neighborhoods indicates that the Confucian norms of ‘filial piety’ 
and ‘self-dedication’ are reintroduced by the administrative bodies to advocate family-
based social tie in neighborhoods and to encourage individual sacrifice for ‘public 
interest’. Interestingly, in everyday practices, these traditional social norms are 
demonstrated and advocated by a groups of community activists, including the 
Residents’ Committee members, wardens and volunteers, who are usually mid-age or 
elderly Communist Party members, in other words, a heritage of the Maoist activist 
culture (Read, 2003; Gui, 2007; Heberer, 2011).  In Chinese cities there are volunteers 
and wardens working in different types of neighborhood: in the Xiao-qu neighbouhoods 
they are named as ‘building warden’ (lou-zhang) while in the traditional house 
neighborhoods they are called ‘courtyard warden’ (yuan-zhang). Read’s(2003)  and 
Gui’s (2007) empirical research indicated that the Residents’ Committee members, 
wardens and volunteers played an bridging role between the government and residents, 
to spread out announcement and collect information. With these community activists, 
the interactions between residents and governments were transferred into personal 
contacts, which in many cases avoided conflict. The wardens intended to mobilise 
residents in persuasive rather than a mandatory manner and make use of their personal 
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relationships with residents to accomplish political assignments. Meanwhile, residents 
would express their opinions to the wardens in peaceful ways out of private respect to 
them. As a matter of fact, when government orders are passed down through the 
wardens, the political instructions are transformed into personal requests in a narrow 
scope and the abstract interactions between the government and citizens are transformed 
into concrete face-to-face conversations between individuals.  
 
4.2.2 ’Wang-ge’  
  
Since early 2000s, the western discourse of ‘public participation’ were promoted 
in Chinese government documents with the rationality of handing over a part of public 
services to the private sector, NGOs and individuals. Following this new strategy, 
governments around China began to involve the private sectors and NGOs in the areas 
of property management, public health, rights protection, population management and 
so on. From 2006, the local governments across China began to adopt a ‘Wang-ge’ 
(grid) approach to promote electronic technology for urban neighborhood management 
and further involve non-governmental actors in public service delivery (Xu, 2007). 
Visually, the Wang-ge looks like an exact regression to the Zhou-li city: a demarcated 
She-qu is segmented into 100*100 square meters grids and each grid is coded as a basic 
administrative unit (Jiang & Ren, 2007). Meanwhile, as the Zhou-li city, each grid is 
assigned with a supervisor who takes charge of inspecting public assets and reporting 
problems to the government (Jiang, 2009). The difference between Wang-ge and Zhou-
li city is that rather than creating enclosed residential compound and restraining 
mobility, the Wang-ge approach aims to facilitate information exchange and involve 
more social actors in public service delivery. In each She-qu the government establishes 
a community service centre. With the help of GIS devices, the Wang-ge supervisor can 
quickly register problems with each public asset on e-maps and report them to the 
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community service centre (Yuan, 2007). The staff members in service center will then 
forward these problems to the professional institutions for fix.  
 Recently, the wang-ge management was further used to facilitate residents’ 
daily needs and create jobs for local residents. In Beijing, the community service centers 
directly took phone calls from the residents and forward their needs such as takeaway 
order, healthy care and appliance repair to local enterprises and NGOs. In Ningbo, the 
Residents’ Committees organised unemployed residents to provide property 
management to the other residents according to the Wange-ge management and created 
many community-based jobs. By the year of 2008, 52 Chinese cities had adopted Wang-
ge management (Wang et al., 2007). 
 
4.3 Post-Maoist subjectivity  
 
Living in the high-speed developing era, the post-Maoist Chinese citizens’ lives 
are put on a fast track: the older generation experienced a radical urbanization process 
in the last thirty five years which took the U.S a hundred years to accomplish while the 
Maoist influence had not totally vanished; young people received very broad and 
dynamic trend of thoughts from all over the world while some traditional Chinese 
values were still embedded in their subjectivities. As the Chinese society becomes so 
heterogeneous, the questions of ‘formation of Chinese people’s subjectivity’ can only 
be discussed with respect on the dynamic influence of hybrid government technologies 
and governmental power on individuals, and the hybrid, multifaceted and even 
ambiguous outcomes. As Hoffman (2014) put in her research of Chinese urban 
professionals and volunteers that: ‘ By focusing on how specific technologies of 
governing are integrated into subjectivity, we may also see how such elements may 
combine with a diversity of political ends… In terms of the urban professionals, for 
instance, at the same time they were enmeshed in governmental regimes and modes of 
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self-regulation that we could identify as neoliberal, their identities referenced a 
collective ethos around the nation and a more Maoist-era politics of building the country 
through labor. Similarly, as volunteers enmesh themselves in processes of 
responsibilization that reference neoliberalism, the practice of volunteering by 
individuals and communities also draws on more collectivist Confucian and socialist 
ethics.’ 
In neighborhood life, we see the divergence of subjectivity between residents 
with different age, career and social class. The most obvious divergence is between the 
community activists and ordinary resident characterized by the generation gap: Read 
(2003) and Heberer’s (2013) research show that only the older residents, who have been 
through the Maoist era, have comparatively strong collective consciousness and 
contribute more to the neighborhood management; the young professionals and migrant 
residents on the hand, usually feel little responsibility for the maintenance of their 
neighborhoods (Heberer 2013). Wan’s (2013) research in Beijing features the divergent 
affect of the governmental power on different residents: while the activists, which only 
take 1 per cent of the neighborhood’s population, actively involve in the government’s 
new programs of self-governance, most of the rest residents choose to live with them at 
a critical distance. Meanwhile, although the government brought back a series of 
traditional virtues in attempt to cultivate citizens’ social responsibility, these efforts 
barely worked on young people. 
5. Conclusion 
         
This paper explores the connection between the Feudal, Maoist and post-Maoist 
governmentalities in the realm of urban neighborhood governance. To summarise, 
spatial practice and social norm have always been regarded by Chinese governors as the 
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main approaches to legitimize and consolidate their regimes at the neighborhood level. 
In terms of spatial practices, the Feudal rulers design enclosed compound 
neighborhoods and use the technologies of wall, gates, curfew to exert direct regulation 
on citizens’ mobility and behaviours. The rationality of segmenting urban space into 
administrative unit is inherited by the Maoist government to design enclosed Dan-wei 
compounds and used by the current government to demarcate the boundary of She-qu 
neighborhood as well as implement Wang-ge management. The difference however, is 
that the contemporary government no longer exert direct control over the neighborhoods’ 
spatial form and the residents’ mobility, but implements more pervasive surveillance 
over citizens according to modern technologies. Meanwhile, according to spatial 
demarcation, the governors not only specify a physical living space, but also create a 
social space for citizens and establish a neighborhood-based social order. In Feudal 
dynasties, this social order is supported by the hierarchical clan system. In Maoist era, 
this order is kept by the state-owned enterprises and in the post Maoist era, this order is 
supposed to be maintained by the neighborhood but is strongly shattered by the 
fragmenting society. As for social norms, the Feudal rituals, especially the Confucian 
doctrines and clan rules play a pivotal role in regulating the citizens’ behaviors in their 
families, neighborhoods and all sorts of relations. These rituals shape collective and 
hierarchy-respecting subjectivities and still have very fundamental influence on how 
Chinese people identity themselves in the society nowadays. The Maoist government, 
although denies the Feudal rituals in vocabulary, is actually pervasively influenced by 
the traditional norms and worked on cultivating collective subjectivity. The post-Maoist 
government on the one hand combines the Feudal and Maoist norms and kept 
cultivating collective and self-regulated residents, on the other hand brings in western 
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values of ‘public participation’ in order to encourage citizens take over some 
responsibilities.  
As the Chinese society becomes increasingly fragmented in the high-speed 
development, the government adopts more diverse and hybrid technologies to maintain 
the social order in neighborhoods. The traditional values are brought back into the 
government discourses to reinforce the social order in neighborhoods and encourage 
residents to cultivate and regulate themselves. The Maoist heritage of an intimate 
neighborhood-based social network and a group of activists are also used to implement 
social mobilisation. At the same time, western liberal values of ‘public participation’ 
and ‘self-governance’ quickly take their rise in recent government discourses to devolve 
part of service functions to the private sector, NGOs and individuals. With these hybrid 
technologies, the government organises a mixture of hierarchical and regional 
neighborhood governing system. On the one hand, the community wardens are 
organised in a hierarchy to pass down the government orders and mobilise participation 
from local residents. These wardens use their private relations to transfer political 
assignments into personal requests to their neighbours, which to a large extent avoids 
conflicts (Sun &Guo, 2000; Zhang &Yang 2003; Gui, 2007 ). On the other hand, in the 
new government technology of Wang-ge, increasing non-government institutions and 
individuals are invited by the government to deliver public services and they formulate 
a neighborhood-based regional governing network. The co-existence of the hierarchical  
system and the regional system is caused by the specific context of China’s social 
transition, but more importantly, it is maintained by the Chinese people living in it, 
whose subjectivities are shaped by Confucian, socialist, liberal and many other values. 
This mixed characteristic of the current landscape of Chinese neighborhood governance 
clearly rectifies the previous literatures on neighborhood governance, which focused 
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only on the Chinese state’s top-down administrative control over neighborhood or the 
emerging self-governing network at the bottom level.  
The legacy of traditional and Maoist norms to a large extent regulate Chinese 
people’s behaviours and facilitate the government’s governance. Some values such as 
patriotism, collectivism, self-dedication and filial piety are still more or less embedded 
in citizens’ subjectivities (Hoffman, 2010). But in the fast-changing and globalizing 
society, Chinese people confront increasing cultural shock from all over the world and 
the traditional values are rapidly supplanted by modern thoughts. The Chinese 
government is inevitably loosing its control over the citizen’ conducts. In contemporary 
neighborhoods, the neighborhood relationship is much more remote than in Dan-wei 
compounds. When the Maoist generation pass away in two or three decades, the 
government will find it more difficult to cultivate community wardens. On the other 
hand, the Dan-wei system is likely to totally retreat from China’s urban administration 
in the next few decades. By that time an important legacy of Dan-wei society – a well-
development social network in neighborhoods –will totally to be supplanted by a 
heterogeneous neighborhood population and bring more challenges to neighborhood 
governance. As a matter of fact, more empirical research need to be carried out to 
explore the changing landscape of neighborhood governance, especially the 
increasingly active participation of non-governmental actors and the formation of 
citizens’ subjectivities (Hoffman, 2014). 
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